Europe’s democratic resilience requires introspection, clear-sightedness and reimagination

The EU’s vision of democracy cannot only be formed in opposition to external threats or the emergence of “others” within the EU. A European defence of democracy – embodied in today’s EUDS – also requires introspective honesty, a grappling with the inherent democratic problems of the EU, and the creative policies that follow from this.

The EU’s founding required reimagining a new form of democracy; one built on a deep distrust of the people. These historical roots continue to structure EU policy responses and institutional governance, even as the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ has long occupied imaginations, if not, till lately, policy. Attempts to close the gap between EU institutions, elites, policy processes and the citizens they govern have been unsuccessful. This long-standing problem remains an unmentioned spectre in EUDS working documents. Missed is a range of policies that could build upon, improve, better embed and diversify those participatory and deliberative innovations that emerged from the last Commission. Missed is a chance to advocate for democratic innovations that refuse to instrumentalise citizen participation to legitimate existing EU policies, in favour of a deeply plural, robustly political, public sphere. Missed, finally, is the indispensability of developing mutual trust between citizens, public institutions and communities to the EU’s democratic resilience and security.

The holistic approach to democratic policymaking in EUDS working documents is to be applauded. Conspicuously absent, however, is the relationship between the EU’s economic policies and the erosion of democratic resilience. Research has shown how towns and regions caught in Europe’s development trap – neither eligible for cohesion funds, unappealing to incoming capital, and economically aimless and relatively stagnant in the long-term – have fuelled and hardened Eurosceptic democratic discontent. The roots of place-based discontent is a varied phenomena, but nimble economic and social policy that is not responsive to its localised realities across Europe risks contributing to corrosive populism and further democratic erosion. As evidence of an economically and geographically inequitable sustainability transition in Europe mounts, these economically and socially vulnerable regions and places are likely to disproportionately suffer. As this translates into political discontent, the danger, as new research shows, is a vicious and mutually reinforcing cycle between democratic erosion and economic decline. The stakes are too high for this to remain a blindspot in the EUDS and for democratic risks to remain relegated, if not entirely absent, from EU innovation and economic policies.

Finally, the pulsing centre of the EUDS is its efforts to battle disinformation on the digital battlefield. There is considerable evidence that algorithm-driven platforms fuel disinformation and polarisation, shaping and shifting public debate and influencing elections. There is considerable merit to strengthening national enforcement of the Digital Services Act, building the capacity of Digital Service Coordinators to address harmful content, building coordination capabilities to counter foreign interference and misinformation across the EU and member states, and enforcing the Digital Markets Act. Yet, the EUDS working documents miss the opportunity to question whether company self-regulation is sufficient for platforms that possess inordinate geostrategic and geopolitical public and private power, yet chronically underinvest to tackle disinformation challenges. Also missed is an opportunity to consider the link between platform business models and disinformation, to question whether even a future-oriented technical regulatory approach can keep pace with technological developments, and nuanced policy avenues for democratising digital governance across each layer of the ‘stack.’

Today, the defence of European democracy cannot do without clear-sighted introspection. Clarity on root causes is indispensable. Yet imagination and courage are essential to developing policies that could revitalise it. To centre non-instrumental democratic innovations, to explicitly link economic policy to democratic revitalisation with equity in mind, to embolden civil society, to holistically approach democratic digital governance and to walk humbly in external action efforts. With these, the European Democracy Shield could articulate a case for democracy worth defending.